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ALINE GRAHN
Precision and Manipulation of Non-financial
Information: The Curious Case of
Environmental Liability
This paper develops a model showing how the environmental liability
regime and the precision of the disclosed environmental performance
indicator affect managers’ incentives (1) to reduce actual pollution and
(2) to manipulate the reported pollution. I assume a company with a
separation of ownership and control which can be held liable for
environmental damages and distinguish between a negligence regime and
strict liability. The results suggest that if there is no manipulation but
only a lack of precision of the disclosed environmental performance
indicator, a negligence rule induces lower actual pollution levels than
strict liability even though a negligence rule is considered to be more
lenient. If managers are able to manipulate the disclosed environmental
performance indicator, they will do so and actual pollution levels will
generally increase. While manipulation makes it easier for shareholders
to escape liability under a negligence regime, shareholders suffer from
manipulation under strict liability due to higher actual pollution and
higher expected damage compensation payments. Therefore, the
manipulation level is higher under a negligence regime. My analysis
contributes to the environmental performance and disclosure literature
by showing that the liability regime is an important determinant affecting
environmental reporting and actual pollution decisions.
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In recent years, the disclosure of non-financial information and environmental
information in particular has become increasingly important to investors and
academics (e.g., Perez-Batres et al., 2012; Cormier and Magnan, 2015; Guenther
et al., 2016). The institutional setting may significantly influence reporting
incentives (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011). Important components of this
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institutional setting are legal rules. In an environmental context, it is above all the
environmental liability regime that builds the legal framework for companies’
environmental pollution behaviour. Its goals are mainly ‘to make polluters pay for
the environmental costs of their activities, to compensate innocent victims, to
protect the environment [...]’ (Brunnée, 2004, p. 351). Thus, it might work as an
instrument to incentivize companies to reduce their environmental pollution,
rationally anticipating that they might have to pay damage compensation
(Shavell, 2007). This paper explicitly asks how the environmental liability regime
affects managers’ incentives (1) to reduce actual pollution and (2) to report the
environmental pollution level truthfully, given that victims of environmental
damage use disclosed environmental information in litigation.
The Volkswagen diesel scandal is a prime example of severe consequences suffered
through manipulated non-financial information. Besides enormous reputation loss
(Kottasova, 2015), high (expected) damage compensation payments (Viswanatha
et al., 2017), decreasing market value (Gomez, 2016), and a scandal-induced CEO
turnover and prosecution (Roberts and Rogers, 2018), researchers estimate serious
associated human health impacts and costs (Chossière et al., 2017).
While it is not clear whether Volkswagen will be liable for these health
damages, other companies such as ArcelorMittal (US Department of
Justice, 2017) and Pacific Gas and Electric, known from the popular movie Erin
Brockovich, have already been sued for environmental damages.
Companies are liable for the environmental pollution1 they cause in many
countries, such as in EU Member States and in the US (European
Commission, 2016; Sigman, 2010). Although liability rules require courts to be able
to observe the actual pollution level, they may find it hard to do so (Goldsmith and
Basak, 2001). For instance, European regulation has required greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions to be monitored and reported since 2008 (EU Directive 2003/87/
EC),2 but there is only limited precision of technical measurement tools (IPCC, 2006;
Virtanen et al., 2013; Unerman and Chapman, 2014). Therefore, I explicitly consider
the fact that there is a lack of precision in measuring pollution levels.
The model in this paper addresses two characteristics of environmental
reporting quality: the precision of pollution measurement and managers’
incentives for manipulation of the reported information. Precision refers to the
accuracy of technical measurement (its noise) and is specified in my model. While
managers may generally find it difficult to influence the precision of technical
devices, they may well be able to manipulate reported environmental performance
indicators by reporting pollution levels that are lower than the actual levels
(shifting the mean). Thus, reporting manipulation and actual pollution are
1 For instance, water pollution, soil contamination, or air pollution. Pollution reduction is an urgent
goal on the political agenda (e.g., European Commission, 2017). Environmental liability has become
an important instrument to reduce pollution. Other approaches to reducing pollution are bans or
regulated trade on pollution certificates.
2 European Parliament (2003), EU Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC.
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managerial choice variables in my model while the precision of the environmental
performance indicator (EPI) is determined by state-of-the-art measurement
technology and is, therefore, exogenous.
I analyze how environmental liability rules affect managers’ incentives to
effectively reduce pollution and to manipulate EPIs dependent on a given level of
measurement precision. Three scenarios exist: (1) no liability for environmental
pollution; (2) strict liability; and (3) a negligence rule. With strict liability, the
company—effectively, the company’s shareholders—is always held liable when its
pollution causes damage. With a negligence regime, the company is only held
liable if pollution causes damages and, additionally, if the company acted
negligently, that is, if it failed to meet the ‘standard of due care’ according to legal
rules. Courts decide on negligence ex post based on the available information, for
instance a company’s reported pollution information. Due to this additional
(information) requirement, a negligence regime is considered to be more lenient
than strict liability. Polluting companies can be held liable under strict liability or
under a negligence regime in both the EU and the US.
In companies with separation of ownership and control the agency problem
between shareholders and managers has to be considered. In my model, only
managers are able to observe the actual pollution level. Shareholders, however,
may be negatively affected by a higher probability of bearing the company’s
damage compensation payments. As a result, shareholders rationally set up a
compensation contract that provides monetary rewards to the manager for
improving environmental performance (Deegan and Islam, 2012;
Strandberg, 2013), that is, for reducing pollution levels. The manager can increase
environmental performance by striving for higher effort levels to reduce pollution.
The effort level is not contractible. The compensation contract is based on an
EPI.3 In a model extension, I also analyze the case where the manager is also able
to manipulate the EPI.
I find that the liability regime strongly influences incentives for reducing actual
pollution levels and EPI manipulation. Results also depend on the precision of the
EPI measurement. The case of no liability is straightforward: there is no need for
manipulation then, and pollution levels are high. EPI measurement precision is
irrelevant.
Without the possibility of EPI manipulation, a negligence regime induces lower
actual pollution levels than a strict liability regime even though strict liability is
meant to be the tougher liability regime. The reason for this is that strict liability is
based on actual damages and, thus, actual pollution—regardless of the EPI’s
precision—whereas under a negligence regime companies can only be held liable
for reported pollution levels exceeding the standard of due care. Lower precision
of the EPI increases type-1 errors—reported pollution is high even though actual
pollution is low—which, in turn, induces the manager to lower actual pollution
levels.
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If the manager is able to manipulate the EPI, the actual pollution level will
generally increase. While manipulation makes it easier for shareholders to escape
liability under a negligence regime, shareholders tend to suffer from manipulation
under strict liability due to higher actual pollution levels and higher expected
damage compensation. Therefore, if manipulation is possible, a negligence regime
aligns the interest of shareholders and managers—the more precise the
measurement technology gets, the more aligned the interest becomes—while they
have divergent interests under strict liability. Consequently, there is more
manipulation under a negligence regime than under strict liability. Note that
without the separation of ownership and control, manager-shareholders would
have no interest in manipulating the reported EPI under strict liability because
only actual pollution, not the EPI, matters for damage compensation. The
incentives for EPI manipulation depend to a crucial extent on both the liability
regime and the separation of ownership and control. This insight may be of
interest to policymakers.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the delicate
interaction between environmental liability rules, pollution-reporting incentives,
and actual pollution. It contributes to different strands of literature. First and most
importantly, my model adds surprising insight to the link between environmental
performance measurement and actual environmental performance. This literature
stresses that environmental performance measures with a low validity will
negatively affect motivation, which in turn endangers environmental performance
(e.g., Virtanen et al., 2013; Lisi, 2015). I find that under a negligence regime, a less
precise EPI might induce the manager to lower actual pollution levels and, thus, a
better environmental performance.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature that addresses the link between
environmental performance and environmental disclosure.4 Li et al. (1997) show
that companies with a sufficiently good environmental performance will report
environmental liabilities truthfully while poorly performing companies will not do
so if there is uncertainty surrounding the existence and size of the environmental
liabilities created, or if there are disclosure costs involved. Legitimacy theory,
however, suggests that poor environmental performers show higher levels of
discretionary environmental disclosure due to greater political and social pressures
(Patten, 2002). I contribute to this discussion by explicitly incorporating
environmental liability and the separation of ownership and control. In the
process, I endogenize shareholders’ expected liability costs, which are exogenous
in the Li et al. (1997) model. Roughly in line with Li et al. (1997), my paper
suggests a positive association between truthful environmental reporting and low
actual pollution levels, albeit based on a moral hazard problem. Moreover, I find
that the above association is influenced by the liability regime, the separation of
4 Most of the environmental reporting literature is empirical and ignores the impact of the
environmental liability regime on reporting choices (e.g., Cormier et al., 2005; Kolk et al., 2008;
Sullivan and Gouldson, 2012; Stanny, 2013; Matisoff et al., 2013; Lu and Abeysekera, 2014;
Matsumura et al., 2014; Clarkson et al., 2015; Griffin et al., 2017).
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ownership and control, and the precision of pollution measurement, all of which
Li et al. (1997) do not consider in their model.
Third, the paper is relevant to the literature that analyzes the real effects of
disclosure, (e.g., Kanodia, 2006; Beyer and Guttman, 2012; Kanodia and
Sapra, 2016; Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017). However, while this literature generally
emphasizes the real effects of financial information on investment efficiency or
risk management in the absence of liability issues, my paper shows how non-
financial information affects actual environmental pollution under explicit
consideration of the environmental liability regime.
Fourth, I contribute to the law and economics literature, which has not yet
analyzed how liability rules affect managers’ incentives for manipulation of
reported information (e.g., Shavell, 2007; Endres et al., 2015). Polinsky and
Shavell (2012) discuss which type of disclosure regime—voluntary or mandatory—
regarding product risks is socially beneficial. They find that mandatory disclosure
rules are more valuable to customers, while the company’s incentives to acquire
information are stronger under voluntary disclosure. However, Polinsky and
Shavell (2012) ignore liability rules, owner–manager conflicts of interest and the
possibility of manipulation.
Finally, my paper enriches environmental accounting research in cross-country
settings in general by providing model theoretical-based justification to
incorporate the environmental liability regime when analyzing companies’ non-
financial reporting choices. In this regard, my work is in line with Ewert and
Wagenhofer’s (2011) claim that the institutional setting may significantly influence
reporting incentives. Hartmann et al. (2013) support this view, especially for
environmental concerns such as GHG emissions. Institutional characteristics that
have already been considered in empirical environmental and CSR reporting
research include the introduction of mandatory reporting requirements
(e.g., Frost, 2007), the national business system and the strength of investor and
employment protection laws (e.g., Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), the quality of
the legal environment (Worldbank’s ‘rule of law’ measure), as well as the
distinction in common and code law countries which proxies shareholder versus
stakeholder orientation of the country in which the company is domiciled
(e.g., Simnett et al., 2009; Luo, 2019). The environmental liability regime has so far
been ignored but the results of my model suggest that it impacts managerial
reporting choices and real corporate decisions strongly. Incorporating this country-
specific institutional characteristic into (empirical) environmental accounting
studies may have the potential to affect prior insights on institutional determinants
of environmental accounting. For instance, differences in companies’
environmental reporting behaviour attributed to their location in common or code
law countries could be blended by the impact of potentially different
environmental liability regimes in those countries. Code law countries are often
assumed to be stakeholder-orientated and, therefore, companies in those countries
are expected to be more eager to fulfil stakeholder needs compared to companies
in shareholder-orientated countries where only shareholder value and pure
financial outcomes count. Thus, in stakeholder-orientated countries better
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corporate environmental performance would be expected. If a code law country
has installed a negligence regime for environmental pollution, my model suggests
lower environmental pollution as compared with a strict liability (potentially
common law) country. The assumed stakeholder orientation as well as the
negligence regime in the considered country both lead to lower environmental
pollution but which of both effects prevails is not yet determined. Careful
consideration of the specific institutional framework is then needed to disentangle
the effects of these two different institutional characteristics in order to be able to
evaluate the impact of each of them.
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN THE EU AND THE US
Strict liability implies that a company is held liable when the pollution it causes
results in damage. Under a negligence regime, a company is only held liable if the
pollution it causes results in damage and it acted negligently, that is, the company
failed to meet the ‘standard of due care’ according to legal rules. Courts need to
decide on whether the standard of due care has been met. As it is difficult to
gather reliable environmental information for outsiders (Goldsmith and
Basak, 2001), they will rationally use information provided in the company’s
pollution report.5 Under strict liability, the pollution report does not matter
because damage compensation is simply based on the occurrence of damages.
Since the (information) requirements for obtaining damage compensation are
more restrictive under negligence, strict liability is thought to provide stronger
incentives for preventing environmental pollution.
In the EU, environmental liability is laid down in Directive 2004/35/EC,6 which
has been amended slightly three times (2006/21/EC; 2009/31/EC; 2013/30/EU).7
Companies face strict liability for environmental pollution when carrying out
dangerous occupational activities such as waste management, the treatment of
5 Even if it is assumed that courts or public prosecutors gather information on their own for a certain
lawsuit, it is likely that this information is at least highly correlated—if not identical—with the
information the company provides, assuming truthful reporting and the usage of a state-of-the-art
measurement technology. Then, both parties (company and court) have to rely on the same
measurement technology that is impaired by a certain imprecision. Thus, similar measurement
results and EPIs can be expected ex ante if the court collects the information on its own.
6 European Parliament (2004), EU Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of
environmental damage.
7 European Parliament (2006), EU Directive 2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive industries and amending
Directive 2004/35/EC; European Parliament (2009), EU Directive 2009/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and
amending Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC,
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006; European
Parliament (2013), EU Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 June 2013 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC.
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dangerous substances, activities under the Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75/
EU,8 or the transport of dangerous or polluting goods (European
Commission, 2016). Companies that do not carry out dangerous activities can only
be held liable for environmental damages if they acted negligently (European
Commission, 2016).
In the US, environmental laws exist at both the federal and state level. State law
applies to environmental damages or sites that are not covered by federal law
(Sigman, 2010, p. 292). At the federal level, the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) assigns strict
liability to the polluting company for costs associated with cleaning up sites
contaminated by hazardous wastes (42 U.S. Code § 9607,9 see also Larson, 2005,
pp. 547–52). At the state level, Sigman (2010, p. 293) reports strict liability in some
states (e.g., California, Florida, and Missouri) and a negligence regime in others
(e.g., Alabama, Colorado, and Idaho).
Therefore, in both the EU and the US companies can be held liable under
either strict liability or a negligence regime, depending on the risk level of
professional activity in the EU and on the law applied in the US. Hence, I analyze
both liability regimes.
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
I analyze a model with risk-neutral actors and a zero discount rate for riskless
assets.10 The shareholders (principal) of a company delegate the decision
regarding actual environmental pollution to a professional manager (agent). The
shareholders (and other parties, such as courts) are unable to directly observe or
control the managerial effort to influence the pollution level. The manager suffers
a disutility from reducing pollution. This disutility can take the form of direct costs
for pollution reduction as the installation of new filters or R&D expenses for the
development of less polluting processes which all debit the manager’s budget that
could be spent on something else. Moreover, it also covers indirect aspects, for
example, foregone leisure time or disutility because the manager does not like
performing the task. This disutility is not verifiable by the court but is known to
the shareholders.
8 European Parliament (2010), EU Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control).
9 US Code (1980), §9607 et seq. 42 U.S. Code Chapter 103: Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act.
10 Introducing a positive discount rate does not alter the results. Such a positive discount rate could
incorporate the fact that environmental damages usually take effect with a considerable time delay.
For instance, probably the most severe consequence of GHG emissions, climate change, is
predicted to take its full effect ‘by the late 21st century and beyond’. (IPCC, 2014, p. 8).
Nevertheless, it can be modelled as a constant factor that discounts the maximum damage D and,
thus, does not change the following analysis.
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In line with fundamental principal–agent analyses (Holmström and
Milgrom, 1991; Feltham and Xie, 1994), shareholders offer the manager a
compensation contract based on a verifiable and, thus, contractible indicator for
the EPI to align their interests. The EPI is called ~y and is a stochastic variable. It
depends on the manager’s decision p with regard to the company’s pollution level.
The EPI ~y is uniformly distributed: ~yuniform p−ε,p+ εð Þ , with 0≤ ε≤ p≤ pmax
and an expected value E ~y½ = p. The distribution parameter ε reflects the (lack of)
precision11 associated with the EPI. In the basic model, the manager discloses the
EPI ~y mandatorily and truthfully. This assumption is relaxed in the extended
model. Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of events.
The compensation contract is non-linear.12 Following Holmström (1979),
the first-best solution can be achieved with a simple hurdle rate contract that
rewards the manager with a lump sum payment if the performance measure
exceeds a certain threshold value. Hence, in my model the manager receives
a bonus s if the EPI indicates an environmental pollution level below the
threshold value set by the shareholders, that is if y≤ yS. Otherwise, the manager
receives no bonus. The bonus s needs to be non-negative due to manager’s limited
liability.
s ~yð Þ= s if y≤ yS
0 if y> yS

with s≥ 0: ð1Þ
Since the EPI is distributed uniformly, the probability that the EPI will be lower
than the shareholders’ threshold value yS equals







The manager’s decision regarding the company’s pollution level p affects the
probability of environmental damage occurrence: ED=Prob pð ÞD= ppmaxD: If the
manager does nothing to reduce pollution (p = pmax), the expected environmental
11 According to Goldsmith and Basak (2001), this imprecision is not only due to technical equipment
characteristics, but also to stochastic environmental events that might have nothing to do with a
manager’s actual effort to reduce pollution levels but which are still kept by the EPI. Hence, I
assume that managers are able to assess the precision of their EPIs, but for outsiders such as the
court the imprecision ε is not verifiable.
12 Note that it is not the aim of this paper to develop an optimal compensation contract, but rather to
analyze the impact of EPI characteristics on pollution reduction incentives under different liability
regimes in as realistic as possible settings. Anecdotal evidence supports the approach of applying
very simple compensation contracts. For instance, Lufthansa Group and BMW Group include
indicators for environmental protection level (Lufthansa Group Annual Report, 2017) or GHG
emissions reductions (BMW Group Annual Report, 2017) in the variable remuneration of
directors. Shell includes metrics for GHG management in a scorecard which forms the basis for
bonus payments and also embeds energy transition into the CEO’s personal performance targets
(Shell Annual Report, 2017). Moreover, a robustness check is included in the Appendix. There a
linear compensation scheme is analyzed. Basic results do not change.
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damage reaches it maximum, ED = D. In the case of no pollution, p = 0, no
damage is expected. This maximum environmental damage D can be understood
as a monetarily quantifiable damage that was caused by a certain company’s
pollution, for example, costs for repairing a damaged ecosystem in a polluted
river.
To keep the analyses simple and focused on the most important issues, I
assume risk neutrality of both actors (e.g., Segerson and Tietenberg, 1992;
Shavell, 2007). Thus, in the absence of environmental liability, the
shareholders’ and the manager’s respective utility functions are reflected in the
following:
US = −s ~yð Þ ð3Þ
UM = s ~yð Þ− 1
2
cp pmax−pð Þ2: ð4Þ
The shareholders’ utility, US, is defined by the manager’s remuneration, s, which
depends on the environmental performance measure ~y:13 The manager’s utility, UM, is
defined by their salary, s (based on the EPI), minus the disutility for their effort to reduce
pollution below the maximum level pmax. The cost function assumes increasing marginal costs
FIGURE 1
TIMELINE OF EVENTS
13 The shareholder’s utility function is non-positive by construction. That does not seem realistic: why
should a shareholder engage in a business if the utility is negative (corner solutions excluded)? This
is a model feature that directly stems from the focus on a single managerial task, the reduction of
environmental pollution. In reality, managers have several tasks. Including an independent second
task that covers manager’s ‘business as usual activity’ and which leads to a sufficiently positive
profit increases shareholders’ utility (e.g., by an increase in share price) above zero. Such an
independent second task does not alter the results of this paper. Consider the respective robustness
check in the Appendix.
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for reducing pollution: the disutility depends quadratically on the particular effort made. It is
expressed in monetary terms by the disutility parameter cp, with cp>0. In order to obtain
interior solutions, I assume that the manager’s costs when avoiding all pollution will exceed
the maximum expected damages, cppmax
2>Prob(p = pmax)D = D. Otherwise, zero pollution
would be socially desirable which is apparently not the case in reality. Without loss of
generalization, I assume that the manager has a zero reservation utility.14
Environmental Liability
The company may be held liable for environmental damages, depending on the
liability setting. I analyze how strict liability and a negligence rule affect the
manager’s choice to reduce actual pollution and to correctly report pollution levels.
I follow the law and economics literature and assume that the standard of due care
is defined by the socially optimal pollution level (Shavell, 2007), which I will derive
in the next section. The court decides whether due care has been met based on the
company’s verifiable pollution report, ~y. Under both liability regimes, the company
has sufficient assets to pay for damage compensation.
The manager is not held liable. This assumption is realistic due to the ‘business
judgement’ rule and the fact that the manager’s assets are usually limited.15 I also assume
that victims face zero transaction costs when bringing a lawsuit (Shavell, 2007). If
transactions costs were too high, victims would not sue and, consequently, there would
effectively be no liability. I analyze this no liability case below.
To test the robustness of the results obtained under these assumptions, some
seemingly crucial ones are relaxed. Therefore, I analyze the impacts of a second
managerial task, an alternative form of the compensation contract, and a normally
distributed EPI. Moreover, the model is also extended by reputation losses either
due to high EPI values or EPI manipulation. These sensitivity analyses are
summarized in the Appendix.
14 This assumption implies that the manager is indifferent between no pollution reductions at all and
the interior solutions obtained in the following analyses. In both cases they expect a utility of zero
in equilibrium (due to the design of the compensation scheme and their optimal answer to that, or
due to the zero reservation utility they receive if they do nothing to reduce the pollution,
respectively). Reality does not support the corner solution of no effort to reduce pollution at all.
There is broad evidence on increasing pressure from various stakeholders companies face
(e.g., Fornaro et al., 2009; Guenther et al., 2016). Hence, it can be assumed that if the responsible
manager does nothing to reduce a company’s environmental pollution at all, an additional penalty
will be imposed on them. Then, they are not indifferent between the interior optimal solution p*
and the corner solution of a maximum pollution level pmax but will choose the interior solution. See
Appendix A4 for a more comprehensive evaluation.
15 Environmental law in the EU and the US defines the liability of the company, not the management
(see, e.g., 2004/35/EC, Art. 8). Moreover, the ‘business judgement’ rule makes it difficult to hold
managers liable (Reinhardt et al., 2008; Bricker, 2013; Told, 2015). But in principle, corporation law
allows shareholders to ask managers for damage compensation if they violated their duties towards
shareholders. In the Appendix, the model extension of managers’ reputation loss due to high
realizations of the EPI and EPI manipulation are analyzed. In a broad interpretation, such a
reputation loss can also be understood as a kind of personal liability of the manager. However,
basic results do not change.
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MODEL ANALYSIS: THE ROLE OF EPI MEASUREMENT PRECISION
UNDER DIFFERENT LIABILITY REGIMES
Initially, I focus only on an imprecise but truthfully reported EPI and ignore EPI
manipulation. I first show the social optimum as a benchmark and then analyze
the cases of no liability, strict liability, and a negligence regime.
Socially Optimal Pollution Level
The socially optimal pollution level is derived by minimizing the expected social cost
function EC(p) (Shavell, 2007), which consists of the expected damages (expressed in
monetary terms) from pollution and the manager’s cost to reduce them:
EC pð Þ=Prob pð ÞD+ 1
2















I obtain a positive interior social optimum, popt > 0, since I assume cppmax
2 > D
or cppmax > d, respectively. The socially optimal pollution level decreases in the
case of higher damages, D, and lower costs to reduce pollution, cp.
No Environmental Liability
Regardless of the liability regime to be analyzed, the shareholders’ expected utility
depends on the EPI y. With the probability Prob(y ≤ yS), shareholders need to pay
a bonus s; with the probability Prob(y> yS), no bonus payment is made. Employing
(2), the shareholders’ expected utility can be defined as




 1− yS−p+ ε
2ε
 
−expected environmental damage compensation: ð7Þ
Equation (7) can be adjusted to the particular analyzed liability regime by
inserting the corresponding expected environmental damage compensation
payments. With no effective environmental liability regime, this expected
compensation payment is zero. Thus, shareholders maximize




Analogously, the manager’s expected utility results in
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EUM =s  yS−p+ ε
2ε
 






cp pmax−pð Þ2: ð9Þ






+ cp pmax−pð Þ= 0: ð10Þ
From (10) I derive the manager’s reaction function dependent on the bonus s:




Given a zero reservation utility, the manager’s participation constraint in
equilibrium is defined by






cp pmax−pð Þ2: ð12Þ
Inserting the manager’s reaction function from (11) into (12), the target level yS
dependent on the bonus s is obtained:




Inserting the manager’s reaction function (11) and the target level in (13) into
(8), I obtain the shareholders’ expected utility dependent on the bonus s:











Setting the first partial derivative with respect to s zero yields an optimal bonus of
zero, s* = 0: The threshold value yS* cannot be derived from (10) because this
reaction function excludes s* = 0 . However, since the no-liability case makes the
reduction of pollution irrelevant, shareholders grant no bonus and do not (need
to) define a threshold value for the EPI.
The manager’s response to a bonus s* = 0 is maximum pollution (see reaction
function (11)):
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p* = pmax:
The resulting shareholder utility in equilibrium is then EUs = 0. Expected
environmental damages reach the maximum level Prob(p = pmax)D = D. Table 1
summarizes these results.
Strict Liability
In this scenario, the company or its shareholders, respectively, have to pay
damage compensation whenever damages occur, regardless of what the EPI
indicates. Shareholders will consider expected damage payments:










The manager’s expected utility is not affected by the liability regime. Thus, I can take into
account the manager’s reaction function p sð Þ according to (11), and may then write:
EUs = −s 








Inserting the threshold level function (13) into (14b) and setting the first partial
derivative with respect to s zero yields the optimal bonus
s* = 2dε






The less precise the EPI (the higher ε is), the higher the potential bonus and the lower the
target pollution level. If the EPI is imprecise, shareholders have to facilitate the accessibility of
the bonus to incentivize managers to reduce actual pollution. The manager responds to the
bonus s* = 2dε by providing the socially optimal pollution level (see (11)):
TABLE 1
RESULTS IN THE CASE OF NO ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
Actual environmental pollution level p* =pmax
Bonus s* = 0
Expected utility of shareholders EUs = 0
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The results are summarized in Table 2.
The intuition is that shareholders bear the full cost of environmental damages and,
thus, design the compensation contract in such a way that the manager fully internalizes
damage payments, choosing the socially optimal pollution level popt. Another interesting
implication of the results in Table 2 is that the lack of precision of the EPI, ε, is not of
interest to the shareholders. Only expected damages matter.
RESULT 1: (a) Strict liability provides efficient incentives to reduce actual
pollution. (b) The precision of the EPI is then irrelevant.
Negligence Rule
Under a negligence rule, the company is only held liable if the pollution it causes
results in damage and it failed to meet the standard of due care defined by the
social optimum (Shavell, 2007):17
yopt = popt: ð15Þ
When damage occurs, the company will only be held liable if the EPI indicates
pollution levels above yopt. Otherwise there is no liability. The shareholders’ utility
function then has two sections:
US =
−s ~yð Þ if y≤ yopt = popt = pmax−
d
cp
−s ~yð Þ−Prob pð Þ D if y> yopt:
8<
: ð16Þ
I proceed with the analysis in three steps. First, I look at the case where
shareholders make sure that liability is ruled out, meaning that the first section of
TABLE 2
RESULTS UNDER STRICT LIABILITY
Actual environmental pollution level p* =pmax− dcp =popt
Bonus s* = 2dε
Threshold value of the EPI yS
* =pmax−ε− d2cp
Expected utility of shareholders EUs =
d d−2cppmaxð Þ
2cp
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(16) becomes relevant (Prob(y ≤ yopt) = 1). Second, I focus on the negligence case
where liability is possible (Prob(y > yopt) > 0). Third, I derive the global optimum.
Liability is ruled out (Prob(y ≤ yopt) = 1) In this case the EPI ~y never indicates
negligence (Prob(y≤ yopt) = 1). Recall that the EPI is noisy and uniformly
distributed between p− ε and p+ ε. To rule out liability for sure, the highest
possible realization of ~y, that is p+ ε, must not exceed the threshold yopt:




It is already known that the highest possible pollution level will be realized
when there is no liability. In this case, it is the highest pollution level not





The pollution level is lower than under strict liability by the amount ε.
Employing (11) and (13), the bonus s* and the threshold value of the EPI yS* can
be derived to specify the according compensation contract:










Thus, under a negligence regime, the bonus is higher and the threshold value is
smaller, that is, more restrictive, than under strict liability. If the shareholders design
the compensation contract in a way that managers realize a pollution level so that
liability is ruled out for sure, they do not have to consider any liability payments. Their
expected utility yields EUs = −s  yS−p+ ε2ε
 












Actual environmental pollution level p* =pmax− dcp −ε<popt
Bonus s* = 2ε d+ cpε
 
Threshold value of EPI yS
* =pmax− 3ε2 −
d
2cp
Expected utility of shareholders
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The results are summarized in Table 3. Note first that the actual pollution p* is
lower than the socially optimal level and also lower than under strict liability and,
second, that it decreases as the EPI becomes less precise (that is, ε increases):
∂p*
∂ε
= −1< 0: ð18Þ
The more precise the EPI ~y , the less the manager needs to reduce the actual
pollution level p in order to avoid negligence. Shareholders can pay a lower bonus
and save managerial costs to incentivize actual pollution reductions then. Thus,




= −d−cpε< 0: ð19Þ
Shareholders achieve the highest expected utility for the most precise pollution
report. Then, ε = 0 is valid and the actual pollution level equals the social
optimum, that is, p* = yopt.




) Ex ante, the probability
that the EPI will exceed the standard of due care yopt amounts to:
P ~y> yopt
 








The expected utility of shareholders then reads:








Inserting the reaction function from equation (11) yields:
TABLE 4
RESULTS UNDER A NEGLIGENCE RULE, GIVEN THAT LIABILITY IS POSSIBLE:




Actual environmental pollution level p* = 2cp
2εpmax−d
2−cpd ε−pmaxð Þ
2cp d+ cpεð Þ <popt
Bonus
s* =
ε d2 + cpdε+ cpdpmaxð Þ
cpε+d
≥ 0
Threshold value of EPI yS
* = −d
2 + 4cp2ε pmax−εð Þ+ cpd 3pmax−5εð Þ
4cp d+ cpεð Þ
Expected utility of shareholders EUs =
d d3 + 2cpd
2 ε−pmaxð Þ−4cp3ε2pmax + cp2d ε2−6εpmax + pmax2ð Þð Þ
8cp2ε d+ cpεð Þ
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EUs = −s 












Employing (13), the bonus s* and the threshold value of the EPI yS* can be
determined. They are included in Table 4. The manager responds to the
compensation contract conditions18 with an actual pollution level that is lower





  < popt with ∂p*∂ε = cpdpmax2 d+ cpε 2 > 0:
Table 4 also depicts expected shareholder utility in equilibrium, which increases




d2 d3 + 2cpd
2 ε−pmaxð Þ+ 2cp3εpmax pmax−εð Þ+ cp2d ε2−4εpmax + pmax2
  
8cp2ε2 d+ cpε
 2 ≤ 0
holds for all pmax > 0, d > 0, pmax  cp > d and 0≤ ε≤ pmax− dcp.
The global optimum The shareholders’ expected utility is higher in the no-
negligence case (i.e., just meeting the standard of due care) than in the negligence




if it holds that:















Since the right-hand side of the inequality in (22) monotonically increases in the
imprecision of the EPI, ε, but the left-hand side does not, there is a threshold level
of imprecision, ε̂, above which shareholders will not want to meet the standard of
due care. Ruling out liability becomes too costly then because the manager’s
bonus increases in the imprecision ε. Thus, if ε> ε̂ , shareholders will set the
threshold value of the EPI (yS*) according to Table 4, albeit with a sufficient level
of the indicator’s precision (ε≤ ε̂Þ, the threshold value is defined as in Table 3.
18 The less precise the EPI (the higher ε), the higher the bonus needs to be:
∂s*
∂ε =
d d2 + cp2ε2 + cpd 2ε+ pmaxð Þð Þ
d+ cpεð Þ2 > 0.
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Synthesis Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the EPI’s imprecision (ε)
and the actual pollution level p* in equilibrium. A first important and possibly
surprising insight is that this relation is non-monotonic. As long as ε does not
exceed the threshold level ε̂ , the manager chooses the actual pollution level p*
such that liability is ruled out and p*+ ε = yopt holds.
19 Thus, with a sufficiently
low measurement error ε, the actual pollution level p* decreases in equilibrium.
However, if the imprecision exceeds the threshold level ε̂, avoiding liability implies
a compensation contract that becomes too expensive for the shareholders. They
will set up an adjusted compensation scheme which changes the manager’s
incentives. With increasing imprecision, the managers will not reduce the actual
pollution level that much and so liability becomes possible.
Note that the non-monotonic relation stands in contrast to the general claim in
the literature that more noise in the EPI will negatively affect environmental
performance (e.g., Virtanen et al., 2013; Lisi, 2015).
The second important insight is that, due to the lack of the EPI’s precision, a
negligence regime generally induces lower actual pollution levels than a strict
liability rule—and lower than would be socially optimal. Thus, incentives of actual
pollution reduction depend on the actual liability regime. Interestingly, those
incentives are stronger under a negligence regime even though strict liability is
FIGURE 2
ACTUAL POLLUTION LEVELS IN EQUILIBRIUM UNDER A NEGLIGENCE REGIME
DEPENDING ON EPI IMPRECISION, p*(ε)
19 This result stems from the assumption of a uniformly distributed EPI. With a normally distributed
EPI, liability cannot be ruled out definitely. Still, I obtain similar qualitative results, because even
when it is impossible to rule out liability definitely, it becomes very unlikely that the company will
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thought to be more stringent. To the best of my knowledge, this finding is novel in
the environmental performance measurement literature.
A third finding is that the shareholder’s interest in the precision of the EPI
depends on the liability regime. In contrast to a strict liability rule where
shareholders’ expected utility is independent of the EPI’s precision, the company’s
shareholders have an interest in a higher precision of the EPI under a negligence
regime. For sufficiently precise EPIs (ε≤ ε̂), when liability is ruled out definitely, as





which is the preferred strategy when ε is too high (ε> ε̂ ), the shareholders’
expected utility increases with a more precise EPI (i.e., a lower ε). Figure 3
illustrates this finding.
RESULT 2: (a) Under a negligence regime, the precision of the EPI matters.
(b) Moreover, there is a non-monotonic relation between the precision of the EPI
and the actual pollution level. (c) Shareholders benefit from a more precise
measurement technology.
MODEL EXTENSION: INCENTIVES FOR EPI MANIPULATION
In this section, the model is extended by a second managerial activity at t = 1, the
manipulation of the EPI, indicated by i. Additional to the naturally given and in
the short term not adaptable measurement imprecision, the managers can now
bias the reported EPI deliberately. Think again of the Volkswagen example when
a cheating software was implemented to downward bias the reported emissions
FIGURE 3
SHAREHOLDERS’ EXPECTED UTILITY UNDER A NEGLIGENCE REGIME DEPENDING
ON EPI MEASUREMENT ERROR, EUS(ε)
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values. Transferred to a financial reporting context, EPI manipulation can be
compared to earnings management.
The incentives for EPI manipulation are analyzed under strict liability as well as
under negligence. I do not analyze the case of no liability, since there is no
incentive to manipulate EPIs in that case.
Manager’s Manipulation Incentives Dependent on the Bonus
Higher levels of manipulation tend to reduce the level of reported pollution:
E ~y½ = p− i: ð23Þ
I assume that i is unverifiable, with 0 ≤ i ≤ p.20 Contracts can still only be made
based on the EPI ~y. Otherwise, there is symmetric information.
The probability that the manager will meet the threshold value of the EPI is
defined by:




Therefore, the shareholders’ expected utility (see (7)) can be derived as:




 1− yS−p+ i+ ε
2ε
 
−expected environmental damage compensation: ð25Þ
The manager’s expected utility now also accounts for the disutility from EPI
manipulation. In analogy to the task of pollution reduction, it is assumed to
depend quadratically on the manager’s particular effort. On the one hand it covers
direct costs for measures that conceal the company’s actual pollution level, for
instance costs for the development and implementation of a cheating software in
diesel engine control systems. On the other hand, this disutility can also include
the manager’s risk of being convicted of manipulation and the according
punishment that they might fear.21 Hence, a manager’s expected utility function
with EPI manipulation is:
EUM =s  yS−p+ i+ ε
2ε
 










The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint with regard to actual pollution
does not change compared with the basic analysis, that is,
20 Consequently, I also adjust the assumption concerning the precision of the EPI: p − i ≥ ε ≥ 0.
21 See the Appendix for an analysis of the impact of additional reputation loss due to manipulation.
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2ε + cp pmax−pð Þ= 0 (see (10)). Consequently, the manager’s reaction
function (actual pollution level p depending on bonus s) does not change either
(see(11)):











− ici = 0: ð28Þ
The manager’s manipulation reaction function then reads:
i sð Þ= s
2εci
: ð29Þ
Thus, the more precise the EPI (the lower ε is), the stronger the incentives for
EPI manipulation. Considering the manager’s zero reservation utility and the
reaction functions p sð Þ and i sð Þ, the threshold value for the pollution indicator (yS)
can be determined:






Manipulation of Reported Pollution under Strict Liability
Table 5 summarizes the results for the cases with and without EPI manipulation
under a strict liability regime.
TABLE 5
RESULTS WITH MANIPULATION OF POLLUTION REPORT UNDER STRICT LIABILITY
No EPI manipulation EPI manipulation
Shareholders’ objective function EUs = −s  yS−p+ ε2ε
 
−dp EUs = −s  yS−p+ i+ ε2ε
 
−dp
Actual pollution level p* =pmax− dcp =popt p* =
−cid+ cicppmax + cp2pmax
cp ci + cpð Þ >popt
Manipulation level -- i* = dcp + ci
Bonus s* = 2dε s* = 2dε cici + cp
Threshold value of the EPI yS
* =pmax−ε− d2cp yS
* =pmax−ε− d2cp




d −2cp2pmax + ci d−2cppmaxð Þð Þ
2cp ci + cpð Þ
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The corresponding threshold value for the EPI is the same as it is without the
possibility of EPI manipulation. Inserting the reaction function and setting the first
partial derivative with respect to s zero leads to a bonus that is lower than without
manipulation because cicp + ci < 1 . This is not too surprising since shareholders will
rationally anticipate that the manager is able to manipulate the EPI and, thus,
lower the reward tied to the manipulated performance indicator (Beyer and
Guttman, 2012). The manipulation level in equilibrium is positive, i* = d/(cp+ ci ).
Manipulation pays off more as damage payments increase, and decreases with cost
parameters cp and ci. Since the manager manipulates the reported pollution level ~y,
they are able to raise the actual pollution level accordingly. Thus, actual pollution
is higher than in the initial strict liability model and, thus, higher than the socially
optimal level. Recall that actual pollution and EPI manipulation are not verifiable
such that shareholders are unable to contract on either managerial activity. Ex
post, the manager will rationally manipulate the pollution report. In order to meet
the manager’s participation constraints ex ante, shareholders need to take into
account the manager’s manipulation costs. Compared with the model without
manipulation, shareholders’ expected utility is reduced:22 shareholders anticipate
that the company’s actual pollution p* will be higher than without manipulation,
which results in higher future damage compensation.
Manipulation of Reported Pollution and Actual Pollution under a Negligence
Regime
Compared with the case of strict liability, only shareholders’ expected damages
and, thus, shareholders’ expected utility will be different under a negligence
regime. The manager’s expected utility and the constraints of the optimization
problem do not change. Table 6 summarizes the results under a negligence regime
for two different scenarios: (a) when there is no manipulation of the pollution
report, and (b) when there is manipulation. Table 6 also distinguishes between the
two different strategies of avoiding any possibility of liability (Prob ~y≤ yopt
 
= 1)





If shareholders want to rule out any possibility of being held liable, they will set
up a compensation contract that induces a pollution level with p − i + ε ≤ yopt.
Thus, compared with the basic analysis, the possibility to manipulate pollution
reports will induce the manager to increase actual pollution without the EPI
indicating a violation of the standard of due care.
Similar to the strict liability case there is EPI manipulation (i* is greater than
zero) and, as a consequence, actual pollution levels will be higher than without
manipulation. In the absence of EPI manipulation, a negligence regime induces
lower than socially optimal actual pollution, but in the case of manipulation, actual
pollution may even exceed the social optimum. What differs from strict liability is




d −2cp2pmax + ci d−2cppmaxð Þð Þ
2cp ci + cpð Þ for all d, cp, ci, pmax> 0.
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that shareholders clearly benefit from pollution report manipulation. Since the EPI
is the only verifiable measure of actual pollution, manipulation of the EPI reduces
the probability of being held liable. For pmax, ε, d, cp, ci > 0 and ε ≤ popt, which is
ensured by definition, shareholders’ expected utility increases compared with the
model without manipulation in both cases, when liability is ruled out
(Prob ~y≤ yopt
 
= 1 ) as well as when liability is possible (Prob ~y> yopt
 
> 0Þ ). In
this way, shareholders benefit from pollution report manipulation under a negligence
regime and higher manipulation levels than under strict liability are realized.
RESULT 3: (a) If the manager is able to manipulate the EPI, they will do so, which
in turn increases actual pollution and future environmental damages. (b) Under
strict liability, the company’s shareholders are fully responsible for damages, and
thus they are worse off when pollution report manipulation is possible. (c) In
contrast, under a negligence regime, the company’s shareholders benefit from EPI
manipulation, since this reduces the likelihood of being held negligent and hence the
expected damage compensation payments. (d) The non-monotonic relation between
measurement precision and actual pollution levels in the negligence regime also
remains when environmental reports can be manipulated.23
I find a negative association between EPI manipulation and environmental
performance, which is consistent with Clarkson et al.’s (2008) empirical findings
and matches anecdotal evidence such as in the case of the Volkswagen diesel
scandal. Still, while the theoretical foundation in Clarkson et al. (2008) refers to an
information argument as presented in Li et al. (1997), specifically self-selection
effects, the main drivers in my model are the liability regime and moral hazard
due to a separation of ownership and control.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I analyzed how the environmental liability regime affects managers’
incentives (1) to reduce actual pollution and (2) to report the environmental pollution
level truthfully, given that reported information can be used in litigation,
manipulation is not verifiable, and that there is a separation of ownership and control.
Actual pollution levels are not verifiable, but are measured by a verifiable, albeit
imprecise, environmental performance indicator. I find that a negligence regime
implies lower actual pollution levels than strict liability in the absence of EPI
manipulation. This is because, under a negligence regime, shareholders have the
chance to escape liability if they induce managers to realize sufficiently low pollution
levels. This is not possible under strict liability. However, if EPI manipulation is
possible, a negligence regime provides stronger incentives for manipulation than a
strict liability regime: shareholders suffer from pollution report manipulation with
strict liability since expected damage compensation then increases. In contrast, under
23 This can be inferred from Table 6, ∂p
*
∂ε < 0 if liability is ruled out and
∂p*
∂ε > 0 if liability is possible.
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a negligence rule, EPI manipulation decreases the likelihood of being held negligent
and, thus, shareholders benefit from this manipulation.
To the best of my knowledge, the assignment of the environmental liability
regime in the EU and the US is not related to a company’s characteristics, such as
whether there is a separation of ownership and control, and the extent to which
there are opportunities for EPI manipulation. My model suggests that a ‘one size
fits all’ approach would be unsuitable to properly address the specific incentives
caused by these characteristics. Moreover, policymakers’ concrete objectives are
relevant. If an efficient pollution level is the aim, and reliable verification
processes allow for virtually no pollution report manipulation, then a strict liability
regime should be set up. If policymakers want to achieve the lowest possible
pollution level and if pollution report manipulation can be excluded then a
negligence regime should be introduced, but an improvement of the state-of-the-
art measurement technology might lead to higher pollution levels. If it is possible
for managers to considerably manipulate the pollution report, then the regulator
should install a strict liability regime because in that case shareholders will not
support the manager’s incentives for manipulation. Additional analyses suggest
that a sufficient reputation loss imposed on the company and, therefore, its
shareholders, reduces potential shareholders’ benefits from manipulation. Hence,
a blacklist of manipulating companies could support regulators’ efforts to reduce
EPI manipulation.
To test the robustness of these results, several robustness checks were
performed. Introducing a second managerial task, analyzing an alternative form of
the compensation contract, and assuming a normally distributed EPI address
seemingly crucial basic assumptions of the main model and show that the results
are robust even if these assumptions are altered. Extending the model by
reputation losses either due to high EPI values or EPI manipulation lead to
intuitively comprehensible shifts of the equilibria while supporting the main
insights obtained with the basic model structure.
A number of predictions for empirical research for companies with a separation
of ownership and control can be drawn from this model. I expect that a shift from
a negligence regime in environmental liability to a strict liability regime will
reduce the extent of EPI manipulation. Within a negligence regime, I would
expect a major improvement in pollution measurement to increase pollution levels
if it is relatively easy to meet the standard of due care. Finally, within a strict
liability regime, I expect companies with a separation of ownership and control to
exhibit higher levels of pollution report manipulation than companies with
manager-owners.
Moreover, the results have implications for (empirical) cross-country environmental
accounting research in general. Given the differential impacts of the liability regime
on companies’ environmental reporting and actual pollution decisions, it is necessary
to control for the liability regime when comparing environmental reporting and
environmental performance in different countries with different liability regimes.
Prior results from cross-country comparisons may need to be checked whether they
still hold when the impact of the liability regime is incorporated in regression
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analyses. Future (empirical) environmental accounting studies can provide evidence
on the magnitude of the liability regime’s impact on managerial reporting choices and
corporate real decisions.
A few limitations need to be mentioned. I did not analyze the impact of the
manager’s personal liability nor explicitly allow for the manager’s capacity
constraints. However, basic analysis suggests that the qualitative results will not
change much. Further, I implicitly assumed that the EPI is the only information
source for courts to evaluate negligence. In reality, courts will also try to find
other evidence on managerial behaviour. Nevertheless, with truthful reporting it is
likely that pollution levels measured by a court are highly correlated if not
identical with a company’s reported EPI if they have to rely on similar
measurement technology. Finally, I assume that victims do not bear transaction
costs when bringing lawsuits, while in fact these costs are positive. This would add
a third player, requiring a game-theoretical extension.
LIST OF SYMBOLS
Latin symbol Meaning
b (b*) Manager’s effort for ‘business as usual’ task, 0 ≤ b (equilibrium
solution)
cb Disutility parameter, expressing (manager’s) cost for ‘business as
usual’ task, cb > 0
ci Disutility parameter, expressing (manager’s) cost for EPI
manipulation, ci > 0
cp Disutility parameter, expressing (manager’s) cost of reducing
environmental pollution, cp > 0
d Marginal environmental damage, D/pmax
D Maximum monetarily quantifiable environmental damage,
caused by a certain company’s pollution
E Expected value operator
EC Expected costs for whole society
erf Error function
erfc Complementary error function
F Distribution function of normal distribution
i (i*) Manager’s effort for EPI manipulation, 0 ≤ i ≤ p (equilibrium
solution)
M Manager
N Normal distribution operator
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pmax Company’s maximum environmental pollution level














rEPI (REPI) Manager’s incremental (maximum) reputation loss due to high
values of EPI manipulation, rEPI, REPI > 0
S Shareholder
s ~yð Þ Bonus contract the shareholder offers to the manager,
dependent on the EPI
s ~x,~yð Þ Bonus contract the shareholder offers to the manager,
dependent on the FPI and the EPI simultaneously
s s*ð Þ Bonus the manager can receive (equilibrium solution)
sx,sy sx*,sy*
 
Bonus the manager can receive dependent on the realizations of
the FPI or the EPI, respectively (equilibrium solution)
t Time variable
T Point in time when environmental damage occurs and liability is
realized
UM (EUM) (Expected) utility of the manager
US (EUS) (Expected) utility of the shareholders
~x FPI, stochastic variable
x Realization of ~x
xS (xS*) Threshold value for receiving a bonus due to favourable
realizations of ~x, set by the shareholders (equilibrium solution)
~y EPI, stochastic variable
y Realization of ~y
yopt Standard of due care (with respect to company’s environmental
pollution)
yS (yS*) Threshold value for receiving a bonus due to favourable
realizations of ~y, set by the shareholders (equilibrium solution)
Greek symbol Meaning
α Parameter of the linear compensation contract (fixed part)
β Parameter of the linear compensation contract, specifies the
impact of the EPI on salary
∂ Partial derivative operator
ε Distribution parameter of ~y,0≤ ε≤ popt , reflects the (lack of)
precision of the EPI
ε̂ Threshold level of imprecision (above which shareholders will
not want to meet the standard of due care)
π Distribution parameter of ~x,0≤ π ≤ b
ϕ Standardized distribution function of normal distribution
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APPENDIX:
To test the robustness of Results 1, 2, and 3, several robustness checks were performed.
Introducing a second managerial task, analyzing an alternative form of the compensation
contract, and assuming a normally distributed EPI address seemingly crucial basic
assumptions of the main model and show that the results are robust even if these
assumptions are altered. Extending the model by reputation losses either due to high EPI
values or EPI manipulation leads to intuitively comprehensible shifts of the equilibria
while supporting the main insights obtained with the basic model structure.
Second Managerial Task
The main analysis focuses on managers’ efforts to reduce companies’
environmental pollution. Since it is not the aim of this paper to develop a model
for effort sharing and optimal compensation contracts for a multitasking manager,
as, for example, Feltham and Xie (1994) do, it has been omitted that managers
will naturally have to perform more tasks than just this environmentally related
one. Nevertheless, for the sake of a more realistic model, a ‘business as usual’
task, b, can be introduced as a robustness check. Higher managerial effort for this
task leads to a higher financial performance, for example, higher profits or higher
revenues. The corresponding financial performance indicator (FPI) is denoted as
~x and assumed to be uniformly distributed: ~x uniform b−π,b+ πð Þ, with 0≤ π ≤ b
and an expected value E ~x½ = b . To keep the analysis simple,24 it is assumed that
each effort only affects its particular performance indicator. If a certain financial
threshold xS is exceeded, the manager receives a(n) (additional) bonus sx . Thus,
the adjusted compensation scheme is:
s ~x,~yð Þ=
sx +sy if ~x≥ xS and y≤ yS
sy if ~x< xS and y≤ yS
sx if ~x≥ xS and y> yS
0 if ~x< xS andy> yS
8>><
>>:
with sx,sy ≥ 0: (A1.1)
The shareholder’s expected utility function is adjusted by this compensation
scheme. Additionally, a good financial performance benefits the shareholders.
Thus, shareholder’s expected utility function is the expected financial performance
24 There is evidence that a company’s environmental and financial performance are related but there
are arguments and evidence for both directions of this relation. While Guenster et al. (2011) and
Qian and Xing (2016) find a positive association between environmental and financial performance,
the results of Horváthová (2012) as well as Delmas et al. (2015) support a negative association at
least in the short run. Trumpp and Guenther (2017) find a U-shaped relationship. Incorporating all
possible realizations of the link between environmental and financial performance would result in
several case discriminations. I refrain from introducing such a link because it would shift attention
away from the initial research question. Basic analyses show that the important main results also
hold when the two performances are linearly linked and both influence the FPI. Nevertheless, a
comprehensive analysis of this scenario might be an interesting issue for further research.
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minus the expected salary for the manager and minus expected environmental
damage compensation payments, depending on the environmental liability regime:
EUs = b−sx  1− xS−b+ π2π
 
−0  xS−b+ π
2π
 
−sy  yS−p+ ε2ε
 
−0




Hence, a positive expected shareholder utility is possible. Managers’ expected
utility function is expanded by the disutility from performing the ‘business as
usual’ task and reads as:
EUM =sx  1− xS−b+ π2π
 
+ 0  xS−b+ π
2π
 
+sy  yS−p+ ε2ε
 
:






cb b2− 12cp pmax−pð Þ
2: ðA1:3Þ
Analogous to the basic model, this model can be solved with backwards
induction. Manager’s incentive compatibility constraints result in the reaction





. Since the value of the FPI is only
affected by the manager’s effort for the ‘business as usual task’ and not by the
pollution level or the environmental liability regime, the bonus sx = 2π as well as
the equilibrium effort level b* = 1cb are the same for all analyzed scenarios
(no liability, strict liability, negligence, EPI manipulation under both liability
regimes). Given the independence of both tasks, the bonus for environmental
performance sy and the pollution level in equilibrium p*are also unaffected by the
introduction of this second task. Thus, all results obtained in the basic model
remain unchanged and are robust.
Only the determination of the threshold values (xS, yS) is not straightforward in
this model. Inserting the reaction functions b sxð Þ and p sy
 
into managers’
participation constraint shows that there are different combinations of thresholds
(xS, yS) that ensure that the manager’s reservation utility of zero is met. For
instance, under strict liability the thresholds for getting a bonus have to fulfil the







+ dε+ π−dpmax−xS + dyS: ðA1:4Þ
The higher the threshold for getting the bonus for financial performance xS, the
easier it is to achieve the threshold for the environmental performance related
bonus, and vice versa.
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Linear Compensation Contract
The simple hurdle rate contract that is applied in the main model permits a first
best solution (Holmström, 1979). It is explicitly not the aim of this paper to
develop an optimal compensation contract. Still, questions concerning the
sensitivity of the results with other compensation contracts are valid. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that EPIs—if applied in managers’ compensation schemes—are
part of a variable component (e.g., Lufthansa Group Annual Report, 2017; BMW
Group Annual Report, 2017). Transforming this into a mathematical expression
suggests the application of a linear compensation contract:
s ~yð Þ= α+ β~y ðA2:1Þ
where α is a fixed compensation parameter and β represents the dependence of
the manager’s compensation on the EPI ~y.
Lagrange optimization of the shareholder’s expected utility in the different
scenarios with respect to the manager’s binding incentive compatibility (∂EU
M
∂p = 0)
and participation constraint (EUM = 0) results in the same findings as obtained in
the basic model: RESULTS 1 (a) and (b), RESULTS 2 (a), (b), and (c) as well as
RESULTS 3 (a), (b), (c), and (d) are robust with respect to the application of a
linear compensation contract.
Normally Distributed EPI
The assumption of a uniformly distributed environmental performance indicator ~y
allows closed-form model solutions. I now assume this indicator to be normally
distributed:
~yN p,εð Þ ðA3:1Þ
The analysis and results of the no-liability case, the socially optimal pollution
level, and the case of strict liability with and without manipulation do not change
because E ~y½ = p (or E ~y½ = p− i , respectively) still holds in analogy to a uniformly
distributed EPI. For all of these cases, only the expected value of the EPI matters.
Therefore, only the results under a negligence rule have to be reconsidered.













The probability that the manager will receive the bonus is:
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Therefore, the manager’s expected utility is reflected by:






cp pmax−pð Þ2 ðA3:4Þ
Shareholders’ expected utility reads:








The participation constraint again sets a lower bound for the manager’s
expected utility:

















cp pmax−pð Þ2 ≥ 0,respectively: ðA3:6bÞ
25
In equilibrium, this inequality is binding and holds as an equality. Taking this
into account and generating the first partial derivative of the manager’s expected
utility with respect to the pollution level, p, reveals an implicit condition for the












p = 0: ðA3:7Þ26
Inserting (A 3.6a) into (A 3.5) leads to the principal’s expected utility, which
depends on the imprecision, ε, and on the pollution level in equilibrium, p*:













Calculating the first partial derivative of (A 3.8) with respect to the pollution level, p*,
leads to an implicit condition that reveals the pollution level induced by the shareholders
(by setting the corresponding bonus that can be determined with (A 3.7):
25 With the error function being described by ϕ ys−pε
 






26 With the complementary error function erfc(x) being defined as erfc(x) = 1 + erf(x) and the inverse
complementary error function erfc−1(z) being defined by erfc−1(1 − z) = erf−1(z).
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This system of equations cannot be solved analytically because of the complementary
error function, which stems from the normal distribution. In principle, a numerical
solution with exemplary values for distinct parameters provides insights into the curve
progression. Assume cp = 2, d = 4, and pmax = 5. The individual optimal pollution level in
equilibrium depending on the measurement precision can be gathered from Figure 4.
Similar to the model with a uniformly distributed EPI, the manager reduces
pollution levels below the social optimum, given that the precision of the EPI is
not too low (too high ε). With a normally distributed EPI, there is a special
feature for low levels of precision: if ε becomes too high, companies will consider
the corresponding EPI ~y to be largely uninformative and thus inadequate for
preventing them from being held liable, so they choose high pollution levels—
even higher than the socially optimal level—to at least save on costs for pollution-
reduction activities. This effect is also reflected in the shareholders’ expected
utility function in Figure 5, even though it is hardly visible: there is a very slight
increase in shareholders’ expected utility for high values of ε, which stems from
savings from decreased pollution-reduction activities. Nevertheless, even for the
most imprecise measurement technology, that is, ε= pmax− dcp
 
, and the highest
possible pollution level, that is, p = pmax, shareholders’ expected utility will always be lower
than for the most precise measurement technology, that is, ε! 0. Thus, the finding that
shareholders would benefit from a more precise measurement technology (which I derived
with a uniformly distributed parameter) also holds with normally distributed EPIs.
To obtain the results for pollution report manipulation under a negligence
regime, once again, only the probability of exceeding the due diligence
FIGURE 4
POLLUTION LEVELS WITH UNIFORMLY AND NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED EPIS
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threshold, yopt (A 3.2), and the probability of complying with the shareholders’
threshold value, ys (A 3.3), has to be adjusted. Figure 6 depicts the pollution level
depending on the EPI’s imprecision for the different cases.
The basic results remain unchanged: when the manager is able to manipulate
the reports, they will do so, yielding higher actual pollution levels. Nevertheless,
shareholders benefit from the manager’s manipulation of reports, because it
FIGURE 5
SHAREHOLDERS’ EXPECTED UTILITY WITH UNIFORMLY OR NORMALLY
DISTRIBUTED EPIS
FIGURE 6
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reduces their likelihood of being held liable for environmental pollution. Figure 7
illustrates this effect (dashed line).
Manager’s Reputation Loss Due to High EPI Values
I extend the basic model by introducing a reputation loss that affects the manager
due to the reported environmental pollution level. In recent years, companies’
environmental performance has become increasingly important to investors and
academics (e.g., Perez-Batres et al., 2012; Cormier and Magnan, 2015; Guenther
et al., 2016). There is evidence that financial markets punish bad environmental
performance with lower share prices (e.g., Matsumura et al., 2014; Griffin et al., 2017),
and that environmental issues in general are included in a company’s risk assessment
(e.g., Kim et al., 2015; Jung et al., 2018). Therefore, managers who are responsible for
a company’s environmental performance might be held accountable directly or
indirectly if they report high pollution levels. Stakeholders as creditors or suppliers
could link this specific manager with a non-sustainable and, therefore, unfavourable
company development. Also shareholders could lose their trust in a seemingly not
environmentally conscious manager. Thus, managers might suffer a reputation loss
for high reported EPI values. In a broad sense, a manager’s personal liability towards
the shareholders can also be modelled as such a reputation loss.
Hence, I expand the manager’s expected utility function as represented in (9) by
the expected value of the EPI multiplied by an incremental reputation loss27, rEPI:
FIGURE 7
SHAREHOLDERS’ EXPECTED UTILITY DEPENDENT ON EPI’S IMPRECISION UNDER
NEGLIGENCE REGIME WITH NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED EPI
27 The incremental reputation loss, rEPI, is the maximum reputation loss, REPI, normalized by the
maximum pollution level pmax. A reputation loss of rEPI  p ensures that if the pollution is maximal,
the reputation loss is maximal as well; if it is zero, then no reputation loss is expected.
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EUM =s  yS−p+ ε
2ε
 






cp pmax−pð Þ2−rEPI p: ðA4:1Þ
Solving the adjusted model with backwards induction results in reaction
functions that include reputation loss. For instance, the pollution level depending
on the bonus, p sð Þ= pmax− rEPIcp − s2εcp , decreases with a higher reputation loss.
Interpreting reputation loss as an additional cost imposed on the manager, it also
enters the expected cost function of the whole society and the socially optimal








Too high reputation losses compared with full pollution avoidance costs and
environmental damages lead to a corner solution: popt = 0. Assuming sufficiently
low reputation losses, pmax  cp − d > rEPI, matches anecdotal evidence as
environmental pollution in reality is not zero. With such a reputation loss, the
environmental pollution level in equilibrium tends to be lower than without
because managers have an additional incentive to reduce pollution in this case. All
further results are in line with the basic analysis: strict liability provides incentives
for the realization of the socially optimal pollution level, the precision of the EPI
only matters under negligence, the link between the actual pollution level and the
EPI’s precision is non-monotonic, and manipulation is higher under negligence
than it is under strict liability and shareholder benefit from manipulation under
negligence.
Also in the case of no liability the pollution level in equilibrium is now lower





A positive reputation loss that increases with the reported value of the EPI
induces the manager to reduce pollution levels—also in the absence of an effective
environmental liability regime. Although shareholders have no reason to provide
a compensation scheme that rewards pollution reduction, managers reduce the
pollution below the maximum level because of the reputation loss they will
suffer.28
Reputation Loss Due to High Manipulation Levels
In this section the impact of a reputation loss that is not due to high EPI levels but
to the manipulation of the EPI is evaluated. Therefore, two cases will be
distinguished: managers’ reputation loss due to manipulation and shareholders’
28 Thus, introducing such a reputation loss excludes the possible corner solution of the basic model
that a manager is indifferent between no pollution reduction and the interior model solution.
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reputation loss due to manipulation. Both occurred, for example, in the
Volkswagen diesel scandal: the resignation of the former Volkswagen CEO
Martin Winterkorn came with a severe reputation loss for him as the responsible
top manager (Roberts and Rogers, 2018). On the other hand, the drop in share
price as a consequence of this scandal is not only due to expected damage
compensation payments but incorporates declining sales due to a decrease in trust
in the former respected brand (Gomez, 2016). Such a reputation loss affects the
shareholder’s utility function while the first one alters the manager’s utility
function. Because the described reputation loss only occurs when there is the
possibility of manipulation, the following explanations are based on the extended
model.
First, I analyze the impact of managers’ reputation loss due to manipulation.
Expanding (26) by a reputation loss, ri
M  i, where riM is the incremental
reputation loss29, results in:









cii2−riM  i: ðA5:1Þ
While the reaction function of pollution level p sð Þ remains unaffected, the
reaction functions i sð Þ and yS sð Þ incorporate reputation loss. As can be expected
intuitively, the marginal benefit of manipulation decreases if the manager has to
incorporate a reputation loss. Thus, a sufficiently high reputation loss mitigates
managers’ manipulation incentives so strongly that there is no need for
shareholders to set a high threshold yS for getting the bonus s.
For strict liability and for the no liability case under a negligence rule, the bonus
s and, thus, the pollution level in equilibrium are unaffected. Only if the
probability of exceeding the permitted pollution level is important, that is, for the
second section of the negligence regime, the bonus tied to the EPI increases.
Because reputation loss mitigates the incentives for EPI manipulation, lower
actual pollution levels need to be realized to lower the probability of exceeding
the due diligence threshold. Therefore, shareholders have to offer a higher bonus
compared with the situation in which there is no reputation loss. Still, the basic
results stated in the main analysis also hold with this model extension.
As a second case, I analyze the impact of shareholders’ reputation loss due to
manipulation. Accordingly, the managers’ utility function is as described in
(26) but a reputation loss, ri
S  i, where riS is the incremental reputation loss30, is
subtracted from the shareholders’ expected utility function (7):
29 The incremental reputation loss, ri
M, can be interpreted as the maximum reputation loss, Ri
M,
divided by the maximum manipulation level imax. A reputation loss of ri
M  p ensures that if the
manipulation is maximal, the reputation loss is maximal as well; if it is zero, then no reputation loss
is expected.
30 Analogous to the incremental reputation loss ri
M. Please consider footnote 24.
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EUs = −s  yS−p+ i+ ε
2ε
 
−exp:env:damage compensation−riS  i ðA5:2Þ
In this scenario, the reaction functions p sð Þ, i sð Þ, and yS sð Þ are the same as in the
main analysis of EPI manipulation because managers’ utility is untouched by this
kind of reputation loss.
Under strict liability, shareholders design a compensation contract that mitigates
the incentives for EPI manipulation. Hence, they raise the threshold for the bonus
yS on the one hand and reduce the bonus s on the other hand. This lowers the
manager’s marginal benefit for EPI manipulation and, thus, the manipulation level
is lower than it is without reputation loss—but it also reduces the marginal benefit
of pollution reduction. Therefore, higher pollution levels result. Moreover,
shareholders suffer from this reputation loss which is shown by lower
shareholders’ expected utility compared with the initial analysis of EPI
manipulation.
While the same mechanisms apply under a negligence rule when the




, the results when liability is




are not altered by shareholders’ reputation loss for
manipulation. Since the condition for no liability under negligence, p− i+ ε≤ popt,
as well as manager’s expected utility and, therefore, their reaction functions p sð Þ,
i sð Þ, and yS sð Þ are unaffected by this reputation loss, all relevant results from the
main analysis are again supported. Only shareholders’ expected utility decreases
because of reputation loss—for a sufficiently high reputation loss even below the
expected shareholder utility in the case in which no manipulation is possible.
Hence, sufficient shareholder punishment for manipulation of the EPI outweighs
the benefit shareholders gain by the managers’ EPI manipulation under
negligence.
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